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CHAPTER I 
---
INTRODUCTION 
Review of Literature 
Since Janis and Field identified the general factor of suscepti-
bility to persuasion, or 11 persuasibility, 11 in 1956,1 it has been of 
particular interest to those concerned with attitude change and group 
dynamics. 2 Many studies have been conducted to analyze the personality 
correlates of persuasibility. Several investigators have found that 
those who are 11 persuasible are also •dogmatic• or •closed-minded•, 
which seems almost a contradiction of terms if the concept •closed-
minded• is taken at fact value. 113 This study was designed to investi-
gate the possibility that the relationship might be explained by the 
existence of response bias in the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. For example, 
do persuasible people have a high intolerance of ambiguity? Do persua-
1 Irving L. Janis and Peter B. Field, 11 A Behavioral Assessment of 
Persuasi bi 1 i ty: Consistency of Indivi dua 1 Differences, 11 Sociometry, 
XIX (1956), 241-59. 
2carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, Personality and Persuasi-
bility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 1. 
3Gary Cronkhite, Persuasion: Speech and Behavioral Change 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1969), p. 131. 
1 
2 
sible people appear dogmatic because of the ambiguous nature of the 
stimulus? Does the subject•s uncertainty tend to cause high scores on 
the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale? 
In his theoretical formulation of open and closed mindedness, 
Milton Rokeach contended that individuals differ in their ability to 
receive, evaluate, and act on information relevant to a particular be-
lief system. This individual difference is often referred to as open-
(or closed)mindedness, that is, the degree to which an individual is 
receptive to new ideas and to arguments.4 A major factor determining 
the degree of open-mindedness, according to Rokeach, is the capacity to 
distinguish information about a given topic from information about the 
source of that topic. He suggested, then, that the person with an open 
belief system is more likely to resist pressures from external sources.5 
Thus, it is the closed-minded, or dogmatic, person, according to 
Rokeach, who should be the most persuasible. 
Using the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E, to identify persons 
who have closed systems of thinking, several investigators conducted 
studies that confirm such a relationship. Norris reported data that 
gives some support to the hypothesis of greater attitude change for the 
closed-minded subjects.6 After administering the Dogmatism Scale to 101 
students, the experimenter presented them with four messages attacking 
4webster•s Seventh New Colle iate Dictionar , (Springfield, Mass.: 
G. and C. Merriam Company, 1971 , p. 591. 
5Milton Rokeach, The ·ooen ·and 'Closed 'Mind (New York: Basic Books, 
1968), p. 58~ 
6Eleanor L. Norris, ••Attitude Change as a Function of Open or 
Closed Mindedness, .. ·Journalism ·Quartetly, XLII (Autumn, 1965), 571-75. 
3 
positively-evaluated concepts. The topics attacked were annual chest 
x-rays for the detection of tuberculosis, the routine use of penicillin, 
tooth-brushing, and annual medical check-ups. The messages, written in 
news story form, were all presented as coming from the U.S. Public 
Health Service, a highly authoritative source. A two way analysis of 
variance showed that closed-minded subjects (those scoring above the 
mean of 129 on the Dogmatism Scale) did exhibit significantly greater 
attitude change than did open-minded subjects. 7 
Cronkhite states that the relationship between dogmatism and 
persuasibility has also been confirmed in studies by Hunt and Miller, 
and others by Cronkhite and Goetz. The results of these studies were 
reported in papers presented at the Speech Association of America in 
New York City in December of 1965.8 
A number of experimenters have reported that subjects who score 
high on Adorno•s F-Scale (a measure of authoritarianism quite similar to 
the Dogmatism Scale) 9 are more likely to conform. One criticism of the 
F-Scale is that some ideological groups emerge as nonauthoritarianism 
when measured by the F-Scale. 1° Further research, however, shows that 
most of these groups share some of the rigidities of authoritarianism. 11 
Wells, Weinert, and Rubel, for example, presented subjects with pictures 
7Ibid., 573. 
8cronkhite, Persuasion, p. 131. 
9F. Lerlinger and Milton Rokeach, 11 The Factorial Nature of the F 
and D Scales, .. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, IV (Oct-
ober, 1966), 397. 
10Daryl J. Bern, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs (Belmont: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1970), p. 23. 
11 Ibid. 
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of a traffic accident and asked them to say which driver was at fault. 12 
The pictures were drawn so that the verdict was obvious. Under condi-
tions designed to produce conformity pressure, however, subjects who 
-
yielded to these pressures had significantly higher authoritarianism 
scores than those who resisted the pressure. 13 Additional support of 
the contention that authoritarians tend toward conformity has been pre-
sented by Jahoda and Cook, 14 Block and Block, 15 Crutchfield, 16 and Har-
vey and Beverly. 17 
Review of the literature shows a lack of attempts to explain why 
there is a relationship between closed-mindedness and persuasibility, 
with the possible exception of a study by Powell. 18 Though Powell's 
study was not concerned with persuasibility, he did find support for 
Rokeach•s theory that open and closed-minded subjects differ in their 
12w. D. Wells, Guy Weinert, and Marilyn Rubel, "Conformity Pres-
sure and Authoritarian Personality," ·The Journal of ·social ·psychology, 
IV (October, 1966), 397. 
1 3I b i d. ' 1 34. 
1 ~. Jahoda and S. W. Cook, 11 Ideological Compliance as a Social 
Psychological Process," Totalitarianism, ed. C. J. Friedrich (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 203-22. 
15J. Block and J. Block, "An Interpersonal Experiment on Reactions 
to Authority, .. Human Relations, V (February, 1952), 91-98. 
16R. S. Crutchfield, 11 Confonnity and Character, .. American Psychol-
og i s t , X (May , 19 55) , 191-9 8. 
l7o. J. Harvey and George D. Beverly, 11 Some Personality Correl~tes 
of Concept Change Through Role Playing, 11 Journal of Abnonnal and Soc1al 
Psychology, LXV (1962), 61-64. 
1 ~redric A. Powell, 11 0pen and Closed Mindedness and The Ab~lity 
to Differentiate Source and Message, .. ·Journal ·of Abnormal and Soc1al 
Psychology, LXV (1962), 61-64. 
5 
ability to differentiate between sources and messages.l9 
Cronkhite, however, believes that the relationship between dog-
matism and persuasibility may depend on the other unidentified factors.20 
He reports that, acEordi_ng to the Cronkhite and Goetz study, dogmatism 
and persuasibility are related to what experimenters tenned "attitude 
instability, 11 the tendency of a subject•s attitude to fluctuate even in 
the absence of systematic attempts to persuade.21 
Stewart suggested a possible integration between studies of tol-
erance for ambiguity, dogmatism, and persuasibility.22 Stewart•s study 
represents an effort to integrate material in order to explain the re-
lationship between persuasibility and dogmatism. 
It seems likely that a subject•s uncertainty may be an important 
factor in this relationship. Specifically, high scores on the Rokeach 
Dogmatism Scale may actually reflect the subject•s uncertainty about 
items on the scale due to the ambiguous nature of the items. If the 
individual has no definite attitudes of either kind, according to Cron-
bach, then his response must be based on response set, and any inference 
to attitude content is invalid. Cronbach demonstrated that most stu-
dents tend to respond "agree" rather than "disagree" when uncertain. 23 
Berg and Rapaport presented evidence that the confounding of con-
19 Ibid., 64. 
20cronkhite, Persuasion, p. 132. 
21 Ibid. 
22Robert A. Stewart, 11 Integration of Tolerance for Ambiguity and 
Persuasibility Studies of Self Esteem," ·psychological Reports, XXIII 
(December, 1968), 1104. 
23L. J. Cronbach, 11 Response Sets and Test Validity, .. Educational 
and Psychological Measurement, VI (1946), 479-82. 
6 
tent response by response-set tendencies is particularly likely when 
all items are keyed positively.24 They gave subjects a questionnaire 
form which had no actual questions but which required the subjects to 
.. imagine the Correct -answer 11 • The answers pres en ted them were various 
options such as 11 true, 11 11 false, .. 11 YeS, 11 11 Uncertain, 11 and 11 no 11 • Response 
bias appeared at a high level of statistical significance, reaching chi 
square values above 80 in some cases. The major factor in the observed 
biases was the preference for 11 agree, 11 11yes, 11 and 11 true 11 type answers.25 
Since the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale consists exclusively of items keyed in 
a single direction, Peabody hypothesized that agreement response sets 
affect high scores on the Dogmatism Scale because agreement is always 
scored positively.26 Two weeks after administering the Dogmatism Scale, 
he gave the same subjects reversals of the original items. He reasoned 
that true authoritarianism would be reflected by items whose original 
form was endorsed and reversed form rejected. The proportion of items 
meeting the criterion was .15. The nonauthoritarianism criterion, _that 
is, disagreement with original and endorsement of reversed items, how-
ever, was met by 45% of the responses.27 In addition, 32% of the res-
ponses were on the Double-agreement type, that is agreement to both 
original and reversed items.28 Double agreement, then, is about twice 
24I. A. Berg and G. M. Rapaport, 11 Response Bias in an Unstruct-
ured Questionnaire, .. Journal of Psychology, XXXVIII (1954), 475-81. 
25 Ibid., 481. 
26oean Peabody, 11 Attitude Content and Agreement Set.in Scales of 
Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Anti-Semitism .and Econom1c Conserva-
tism 11 ·Journa 1 of Abnormal and So·cial .Psycho logy, LXI I I (1961), 10. 
' . 
27Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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as frequent as true authoritarianism responses. Peabody also reported 
that of all the Dogmatism Scale items agreed to in the original, 67% 
were also agreed to in their reversed forms. 29 His results indicated 
that agreement with the originals could usually be attributed to agree-
ment response set rather than attitudes favorable to dogmatism. Licht-
enstein, Quinn, and Hover, using two different measures of agreement 
response set, also found data to indicate that the Dogmatism Scale is 
vulnerable to acquiescence response set. 30 
Peabody believes that acquiescence response tendencies operate 
when an item is ambiguously worded. Most authoritarianism items, he 
contends, are ambiguous; thus, the high incidence of double agreement 
31 in the data. 
Rokeach has suggested that double-agreement can be explained by 
the fact that the subject tells the truth in one case because he sees no 
reason why he should not but deliberately 1 i es in the second case because 
he sees the lie as being a more socially desirable answer. 32 The assump-
tion, however, that dogmatism scale reversals are viewed as socially 
more desirable than original items, according to McBride and Moran, ap-
33 pears untenable and unsupported. 
29Ibid. 
30E. Lichtenstein, R. P. Quinn, and G. L. Hover, 11 Dogmatism and 
Acquiescent Response Set, .. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
LXIII (1961), 636-38. 
31 Peabody, 11Attitude Content," 10. 
32Milton Rokeach, 11 The Double Agreement Phenomenon: Three Hypo-
theses, .. Psychological Review, LXX (July, 1963), 305. 
33Loren McBride and Gary Moran 11 Double Agreement as a Function 
of Item Ambiguity and Susceptibility to Demand Implications of the Psy-
chological Situation, .. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, VI 
(May, 1967), 116. 
8 
Rokeach has objected to Peabody's claim that items in the Dog-
matism Scale are ambiguous. He noted that Peabody's statement was made, 
11Without providing the slightest independent empirical support, that 
response set is a -fllflction of ambiguity of items ... 34 
McBride and Moran, however, have demonstrated that double agree-
ment on the Dogmatism Scale is, indeed, highly dependent upon the rel-
ative ambiguity of the items involved. 35 Three experimenters had 166 
psychology students rate the ambiguity of each item on the Dogmatism 
Scale using an eight-point rating scale. In this manner, mean ambiguity 
scale values were obtained for each item. Both original and reversed 
forms of the Dogmatism Scale were administered to subjects. Data indi-
cate that double agreement on the Dogmatism Scale correlated .83 with 
the rated ambiguity of items, a highly significant correlation. 36 They 
also presented strong evidence to indicate that approval-dependent indi-
viduals shows more double-agreement and point out that in other situa-
tions double-agreers would have been classified erroneously as authori-
tarians.37 A study conducted by Miklich also yielded data indicating 
that the ambiguous items on the Dogmatism Scale did elicit more agree-
38 
ment response set. 
Peabody contends that the existence of ambiguity on items of the 
Dogmatism Scale is generally recognized by those who have examined them 
34Rokeach, 11 Double Agreement, .. 307. 
35~1cBride and Moran, 11 Double Agreement, .. 117. 
36Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 118. 
38o. R. Miklich, "Item Characteristics and Agreement-Disagreement 
Response Set," Dissertation Abstracts, XXVI (1965), p. 6210. 
9 
closely, with the possible exception of Rokeach. 39 In the construction 
of the dogmatism scales, according to Peabody, the intention to have 
both rational and irrational aspects in each item produced amb.iguity. 
- -
In addition, Miklich reported that his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
( 1965) contains evidence to show that the content of the D_ogmati sm 
Scale is ambiguous.40 
Accumulated data, then, do seem to indicate that items on the 
Dogmatism Scale are am~iguous and that agreement response sets operate 
as a joint function with definite attitudes. 
Thus, high scores on the Dogmatism Scale might well be re-inter-
preted as actually reflecting uncertainty. The relationship of this 
uncertainty to persuasibility fits well within the consistency theories 
of attitude change. Osgood and Tannenbaum, proponents of this theory of 
attitude change, contend that changes in evaluation are always in the 
direction of increased congruity with the existing frame of reference. 41 
For example, if a person or other some source of information which a 
subject regards positively (or negatively) supports an opinion which the 
subject regards negatively (or positively), "there is a marked tendency 
to change either the evaluation of the opinion or the evaluation of the 
source in a direction which would reduce incongruity.42 Festinger, in 
39Dean Peabody, 11 Authoritarianism Scales and Response Bias, 11 Psy-
chological Bulletin, LXV (January, 1966), 13. 
40D. R. Miklich, 11 Peabody•s Agreement Response Set Measure: A 
Reply to Samelson," PSYtholoQical ·Reports, XVIII (January-June, 1966), 
200. 
4lc. E. Osgood and P. Tannenbaum, 11 The Principles -of Co.ngruity and 
the Predictirin of Attitude Change,•• · p~ychologic~l Re~iew, LXIII (Jan-
uary, 1955), 43. 
42 Ibid. 
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his congruity dissonance theory, also maintains · that there is pressure 
toward consonant relations among c_ogniti ons and to avoid and reduce dis-
sonance.43 Therefore, as a subject tends to be certain about items he 
--
sees as ambiguous, dissonance may have arisen. If that subject had low 
tolerance for amb_iguity, pressure to restore consonance or balance 
should be great. The combination of uncertainty, dissonance arousal, 
and low tolerance for amb.iguity could lead to attitude change. Such a 
prediction fits Crutchfield•s finding that subjects who have a high 
conformity score tend to agree with tests that represent an intolerance 
for ambiguity. 44 
A high persuasibility score, then, may reflect uncertainty and 
intolerance of ambiguity on the part of the subject. Thus, the rela-
tionship between a high dogmatism score and a high persuasibility 
score may be explained in part by the fact that the subject has a high 
intolerance for ambiguity and is actually uncertain about items on the 
Dogmatism Scale due to their ambiguous nature. The purpose of this 
study is to examine this explanation. 
Operational Definitions 
1. High dogmatism: The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, FormE, was ad-
ministered to all subjects. Since upper and lower groups consisting of 
25% from the extremes of the criterion score distribution are optimal 
.for the . s~u9~ . ~~ - ~est items,45 the upper 25% of the dogmatism scores 
43Leon Festinger~ .A.Theory ·of ·cognitive ·Dissonance (Evanston: Row 
Peterson , 1 9 57 } ,' p • 9 • 
44crutchfield, 11 Conformity and Character, .. 195. 
45Truman L. Ke 11 ey ~ 11 The Se 1 ect i.on .. of .upper .and Lower .Groups for 
the Validation of Test Items, .. ·Jaurnal ·of .Educational ·psychology, XXX 
(January, 1939}, 24. 
11 
were considered h.igh. Those scores of 169 and above were in the upper 
quartile. 
2. Low D.ogmatism: The lower 25% of the dogmatism scores were 
considered low. ·scores of 134 and below were in the lower quartile. 
3. High Persuasibility: A persuasibility score was obtained for 
each subject by use of the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test. The upper 
25% of the scores, scores of 14 and above were considered high. 
4. Low Persuasibility: The lower 25% of the scores, scores of 8 
and below, were considered low. 
5. High intolerance of ambiguity: An intolerance of ambiguity 
score was obtained for each subject by use of the Budner Intolerance of 
Ambiguity Scale. The upper 25% of the scores were considered high. 
Scores of 56 and above were in the upper quartile • 
. 6. Low intolerance of ambiguity: The lower 25% of the scores, 
scores of 42 and below, were considered low. 
7. Uncertainty Score: The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, reconstruct-
ed by the author, to provide an uncertainty category (Form P), was ad-
ministered to each subject. The total number of times a subject answer-
ed 11 Uncertain due to ambiguous nature of the statement, .. on Form P was 
that subject•s uncertainty score. 
Research Hypotheses 
1. Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have 
significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who score low on the 
persuasibility test. 
2. Subjects who score high on the intolerance of ambiguity scale 
will have significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who score low 
12 
on the intolerance of ambiguity scale. 
3. Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have 
significantly higher intolerance of ambiguity scores than those who 
score low on the ·persuasibility test. 
~~ 4. There will be a significant positive correlation between 
dogmatism scores and uncertainty scores. 
5. Subjects who score high on the persuasibility test will have 
significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score low on the 
persuasibility test. 
6. Subjects who score high on the dogmatism scale will have 
significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score low on the 
dogmatism scale. 
7. Subjects who score high on the intolerance of ambiguity scale 
will have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those who score 
low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale. 
The first two hypotheses were designed to determine the relation-
ship between persuasibility and dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity 
and dogmatism. Dogmatism scores provided the dependent variable, and 
persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity, the independent variables. 
The third hypothesis was designed to determine the relationship 
between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity. The dependent var-
iable is intolerance of ambiguity, and persuasibility is the independent 
variable. 
Hypothesis four was designed to determine whether or not a sig-
nificant correlation exists between ~ogmatism scores and uncertainty 
scores. 
13 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh hypotheses were designed to deter-
mine the relationship between persuasibility, dogmatism, intolerance of 
ambiguity, and uncertainty scores. The independent variables are the 
persuasibility, dogmatism, and intolerance of ambiguity scores. The 
dependent variable is the uncertainty score. 
CHAPTER II 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Subjects 
Subjects were 121 students enrolled in seven undergraduate 
speech classes at Auburn University. They were assigned to the classes 
by the Registrar on the bas 'is of class requests in the order received 
and on the basis of class size. 
Measurement 
Janis-Field Persuasibility Test 
This test consists of three components: (1) the Initial 
Questionnaire, followed by (2) Booklet I, containing five persuasive 
communications on five topics, each of which is followed by the three 
pertinent questions from the Initial Questionnaire, followed by (3) 
Booklet II, a second series of five persuasive communications on 
exactly the same topics as the first series, but taking diametrically 
opposite positions to those taken in the first series. After each com-
munication in Booklet II the subjects are given the same opinion quest-
ions they had answered earlier in the Initial Questionnaire and in Book-
let I. At three different times the subjects are asked to express their 
opinions: first, before any communication is presented; a second time, 
after reading the initial set of communications (Booklet I); and again 
15 
after reading an opposing set of communications (Booklet II). The 
tests are scored accordi_ng to the number .of opinion cha_nges produced. 
The r~nge of possible scores is 0 to 30, with higher scores representing 
more persuasible subjects. 
The reliability of the persuasibility test was investigated by 
the author in a subsample of approximately 100 cases. The subsample 
was a stratified random sample of approximately equal numbers of male 
and female subjects. The split-half reliability was determined by 
giving each subject one persuasibility score on the 15 odd items and 
another score on the 15 even items. Just as with the total scores 
based on all 30 items, the subtest scores represent the number of items 
on which an individual showed an opinion change in the direction advo-
cated by one or another of the communications. The raw reliability co-
efficient was found to be .69; the estimated value or the reliability 
coefficient was .81 when corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula. 46 
The internal consistency of the persuasibility test was studied 
in the same subsample. Data showed a positive relationship among chang-
es on the various topics comprising the persuasibility. Janis and Field 
repprt that the findings support the general hypothesis that there are 
consistent individual differences in the opinion changes elicited by a 
series of diverse communications. 47 
Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E 
This scale is the most refined draft of a series of five ed-
.. it1on~ . th~t . h~q . Qeen subjected to item analysis and reliability stud-
46carl Hovland and 1 . . L. Janis~ · Persona 1 itY ·and · Persuasibil ity 
{New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959)., ·p • . 41. 
47 Ibid., p. 43. 
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ies to isolate the most consistent and discriminating items. Form E is 
composed of 40 items, each attempting to measure a specific character-
istic of the theory of open and closed belief-disbelief systems des-
cribed by Rokeach.48-
The scale is presented as a personal opinion questionnaire con-
taining the forty items to which the subject must respond in terms of 
the degree to which he agrees or disagrees with that statement. The 
response is made according to a six point scale ranging from 11 I agree 
very much 11 to 11 I disagree very much 11 • The subject must indicate his 
opinion by responding with a plus or a minus 1, 2, or 3 depending on 
the extent to which he agrees or disagrees with the statement. All the 
statements are keyed in a single direction; that is, a positive answer 
always indicates closed-mindedness, while a negative answer al\'Jays in-
dicates open-mindedness. The more positive the response, then the more 
it contributes to the score of dogmatism, or more simply, closed-mind-
edness. 
Rokeach reports reliability ranging from .68 to .93 with a median 
r of approximately .78.49 All but two of these reliability coefficients 
were calculated by the split-half method and corrected by the Spearman-
Brown formula for increasing test length. Test-retest reliability 
coefficients yielded .84 with one month intervals and .71 with a five to 
six month interval. 
The Dogmatism Scale has construct validity in that its construct-
ion was based directly on the very qualities Rokeach used to describe 
. . . . . . . . . . ' ..... . 
48Rokeach~ ·The ·open ·and ··c16ied · Mi~d, p. 73. 
49 Ibid., p. 90. 
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dogmatism. Although high scores, as pointed out in the revietJ of liter-
ature, might reflect a tendency to agree when uncertain, the scale does 
discriminate between individuals that actually do operate in a different 
manner on certain tasks. It separates individuals by the extent of 
their dogmatism with the dogmatism of others, based on the same stand-
ards. 
Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale 
The scale is made up of 16 statements with each statement design-
ed to tap at least one of the four postulated indicators of perceived 
threat and to refer to at least one of the three types of ambiguous 
situations defined. The perceived threat component is inserted to ex-
tract a reaction from the subjects. These 16 statements were selected 
after subjecting the initial group of 33 items to item analysis and 
reliability studies. The scale was administered to 813 subjects in 16 
different groups. Reliabilities were computed by means of Cronbach's 
alpha formula, with the mean of the scale in these samples being ap-
proximately .49.50 Though the magnitude of these reliability coef-
ficients compares unfavorably with those usually reported, Budner lists 
three contributing factors: use of the alpha rather than the split-
half coefficient which tends to overestimate the reliability figure; the 
freedom of the ambiguity scale from acquiescence and social desirabil-
ity estimates, and the complex multidimensional nature of the concept 
itself since it is generally true that the more complex the construct 
and the more complex the measure, the lower will be the reliability 
. . . . . . . . . . 
50stanley Budner, .11 lntolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Var-
i ab 1 e, II · Journa 1 ·of · Persona 1; ty, XXX (March, 1962), 34. 
18 
estimate. 51 In addition, a 15 member experimental group was given the 
ambiguity scale twice, at intervals ranging from two weeks to two mon-
ths, with a test-retest correlation of .85. 
Validity was -established by several methods. The scale shows 
significant correlation (.05) with three other scales designed to mea-
sure intolerance of ambiguity. Significant correlations were also ob-
tained with the scale and judgements of autobiographical material (.05) 
and with the scale and peer ratings in terms of tolerance-intolerance 
of ambiguity (.01). 
This scale has an equal number of positively and negatively 
keyed items. Very low and insignificant correlations were obtained 
between two measures of acquiescence and the Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale. 52 Correlation between a measure of social desirability and the 
ambiguity scale seems to be relatively free of both acquiescent and soc-
ial desirability response tendencies.53 
Procedure 
The 121 subjects were in seven classes and each class was assign-
ed a letter of identification: Groups A, 8, C, D, E, F, and G. Tests 
were administered as a part of two regularly scheduled class meetings. 
In the first treatment, all groups completed the Initial Ques-
tionnaire. Groups A, C, E, and G completed the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, 
Form E. Groups 8, D, and F completed Form P of the Dogmatism Scale. 
All groups completed Booklet I of the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test. 
5lioid., 35. 
52 Ibid., 33. 
53ro;d. 
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In the second treatment, (two weeks after the first treatment), 
all groups completed the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Scale. Groups 
A, C, E, and G completed Form P of the Dogmatism Scale. Groups B, D, 
and F completed the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, Form E. 
All subjects responded to all materials. 
Data Analysis 
In analyzing the data, the mean scores of subjects were compared 
for statistical significant differences by the use of the t test. Ken-
dall's tau coefficient was used to determine the correlation between 
dogmatism scores and uncertainty scores. Three t tests and one cor-
relation measure were used. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects who score high on the per-
suasibility test would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than 
those who scored low on the persuasibility test. The hypothesis was 
supported. Results were significant at the .05 level. All tests were 
one-tailed. Results of hypotheses 1 and 2 are presented in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DOGMATISM 
SCORES OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN PERSUASIBILITY AND 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN INTOLERANCE OF Af\1BIGUITY 
Variables No. Mean of Dog, Scores Variance df t 
Hi Persuasi. 34 167.088 741.232 67 4.296* 
Lo Persuasi. 35 135.971 1063.556 
Hi Intolerance 32 163.031 750.353 61 2.942* 
Lo Intolerance 31 138.613 1430.110 
*Significant at the .05 level. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects who scored high on the in-
tolerance of ambiguity scale would have significantly higher dogmatism 
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scores than those who scored low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale. 
Results of the t test supported the hypothesis, showing significance at 
the .05 level, as indicated in Table 1. 
Variables 
Hi Persuas. 
Lo Persuas. 
TABLE 2 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTOLERANCE 
OF M·1BIGUITY SCORES OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN 
PERSUASIBILITY 
No. Mean of Intol. Scores Variance df 
34 49.647 81.750 67 
35 49.200 108.812 
t 
0.190 
Hypothesis 3 prediced that subjects who scored high on the per-
suasibility test would have significantly higher intolerance of ambig-
uity scores than those who scored low on the persuasibility test. As 
indicated in Table 2, the analysis using the t test failed to support 
the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant correlation between dogma-
tism scores and uncertainty scores. Kendall's Rank-Order Correlation 
was used to test the hypothesis. Results showed the value of Kendall's 
tau to be +.02, which represents practically no correlation at all. 
The hypothesis was rejected since results were not significant at the 
.05 level. The data used in Table 2 is shown in Appendix B. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that subjects who had high persuasibility 
scores would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those 
who had low persuasibility scores. The t tests failed to support the 
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hypothesis, as indicated in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY SCORES 
OF SUBJECTS HIGH AND LOW IN PERSUASIBILITY, BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
HIGH AND LOW IN DOGMATISM, AND BETWEEN SUBJECTS HIGH AND 
LOW IN INTOLERANCE OF AMBIGUITY 
Variables · · · No~ · · · ·Mean ·of · unct ~ ·Scores · · ·varia nee · · · · df · · · · · · · t · · · 
Hi Persuas. 34 1.853 4.553 67 1.947 
Lo Persuas. 35 4.171 43.793 
Hi Dogmatism 31 2.258 5.598 61 0.723 
Lo Dogmatism 32 3.125 39:. 145 
Hi Intol. 32 2.656 9.459 61 0.121 
Lo Intol. 31 2.806 39.295 
There was no significant difference between the uncertainty scores of 
the two groups at the .05 level, and results were in the direction op-
posite to that predicted. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that subjects who had high dogmatism 
scores would have significantly higher uncertainty scores than those 
who had low dogmatism scores. The t test was used to analyze results, 
. 
and the hypothesis was rejected. There was no significant difference 
between the uncertainty scores of the two groups. The results, however, 
were in the direction opposite that predicted, as seen in Table 3. 
- .. -
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Conclusion 
First Conclusion 
A relationship exists between high scores on the Rokeach 
Dogmatism Scale and high scores on the Janis-Field Persuasibility Test. 
People who are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more persua-
sible than those who are not dogmatic. This finding was expected and 
agrees with results from earlier studies, (Supra, p. 2). 
Second Conclusion 
A relationship exists between high scores on the Rokeach Dog-
matism Scale and high scores on the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity 
Scale. People who are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more 
intolerant of ambiguity than those who are not dogmatic. 
Third Conclusion 
People who are highly persuasible are not significantly more 
tolerant of ambiguity than those who are not persuasible. Contrary to 
the prediction included in Chapter I based on Crutchfield•s results and 
the balance theories of attitude change, there seems to be no significant 
relationship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity. Con-
sequently, intolerance of ambiguity apparently is not a factor in the 
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relationship between dogmatism and persuasibility. 
The contradiction with Crutchfield•s earlier findings might be 
explained by considering possible differences between conformity, with 
which his experiment -was concerned, and persuasi bil ity as measured by 
the Janis-Field Test. Further investigation would be required to con-
firm this explanation and to establish the definite lack of relation-
ship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity. 
Fourth Conclusion 
Uncertainty due to the ambiguous items on the scale, as measured 
by the reconstructed form of the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, is not a fac-
tor in the relationship between dogmatism and persuasibility. There was 
no significant correlation between dogmatism and uncertainty scores. No 
relationship was demonstrated between high persuasibility, dogmatism, or 
intolerance of ambiguity scores and high uncertainty scores. 
Although there were no findings of statistical significance con-
cerning the uncertainty score, the consistency of their direction raised 
some interesting questions. In every case in which the uncertainty 
scores were compared with the other three variables there was a tendency 
for the uncertainty score to be in the opposite direction from that pre-
dicted. For example, subjects who had high dogmatism scores, instead of 
having significantly higher uncertainty scores as predicted, had slightly 
lower uncertainty scores than those who had low dogmatism scores. Table 
3 shows that the same was true for both persuasibility and intolerance 
of ambiguity. These results suggest the following possible conclusions: 
a. Those subjects who tend to be uncertain 
about items on the dogmatism scale because 
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of the am~iguous nature of the items are 
not erroneously classified dogmatic. Ac-
quiescent response set based on the sub-
--ject's uncertainty and ambiguity of the 
stimulus, therefore, could not be cited as 
a factor in the relationship. 
b. An alternative explanation is that the 
reconstructed form of the dogmatism 
scale failed to measure true uncertainty. 
If the scale did not actually measure 
uncertainty, it is still possible that at 
least a portion of the theory underlying 
this experiment is valid. 
There are several reasons for believing the latter explanation 
is true. First, there was a tendency for the students to avoid select-
ing the uncertainty category. From a possible score range of 0 to 40 
the overall mean of the uncertainty scores was only 2.78. In addition, 
37 of the 121 subjects had a score of 0, indicating that they were not 
certain about any of the forty statements. When discussing the results 
with the students later, however, many of them expressed contradictory 
opinions. They complained that many of the statements on the scale were 
11 Unclear,'' 11 Confusing, 11 and 11 could be taken to mean different things to 
different people ... When asked why their uncertainty scores did not 
reflect these findings, several explanations were: 
11 I didn't know it would be all right to 
rna rk that answer often; 11 
11 I don't like to keep answering as if I 
don't have any opinions about things; .. 
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11 1 didn•t notice that we had a chance to 
be neutral--! was just used to the idea 
of .agreei .ng or disagreeing. 11 
Th~ most l.ogical explanation for the very low uncertainty scores seems 
to be that the col)~ge students who served as subjects have been some-
what 11 Conditioned 11 to. give yes or no answers and to avoid a neutral or 
uncertain position. 
Additional evidence for the idea that the uncertainty category 
failed to elicit response from those who were actually uncertain can 
be found on the test papers in the form of erasures, changed answers, 
marks beside the statements, question marks, and omitted answers. For 
example, it was not uncommon for a subject to place a question mark in 
the margin beside an item, to circle a number, and later scratch 
through that answer and select another number. The ambivalence suggests 
uncertainty on the part of the subject, but the uncertainty category 
was avoided. 
Based on the balance theories of attitude change, this study was 
designed to supply an 11 escape 11 or 11Way out 11 of the dissonance-producing 
ambiguous situation for those who were intolerant of ambiguity. It was 
theorized that the person who had a high intolerance score and also a 
high persuasibility score was prompted by response set tendencies to a-
gree when uncertain and thus have a high dogmatism score. It was fur-
ther predicted that he would state his uncertainty and neutrality when 
allowed to do so, thus escaping the dissonance situation. 
The subjects, however, apparently did not see this choice as an 
escape. Perhaps, if one has a h.igh intolerance of ambiguity, that is, 
sees ambiguous situations as threatening, he will avoid admitting that 
27 
he is faci~g an am~iguous situation. Perhaps seeing a situation as 
ambiguous and remaini.ng uncertain about it would increase, rather 
than decrease, dissonance. 
On the other h~nd, one who sees am~iguous situations as non-
threateni.ng (has an intolerance of amb.iguity score) will admit more 
readily that he is faced with an ambiguous situation, call it that 
. ' 
and be content not to make a decision about it. Therefore, both the 
predicted results of the study and the contradictory actual results 
with regard to the uncertainty factor may still be consistent with 
balance theories. 
··Recommendations 
Once the factors that cause the relationship between dogmatism 
and persuasibility are isolated, it might be possible to formulate 
principles of persuasion to be employed by a persuader with a given 
audience. This study failed to provide an acceptable explanation for 
this relationship. Several suggestions for further research, however, 
can be made. 
1. More investigation is needed in order to confirm the lack 
of relationship between persuasibility and intolerance of ambiguity. 
A study designed to investigate the relationship using measures of per-
suasibility and intolerance other than the ones used in this study 
would be of value. This information would increase accumulated know-
1 edge concerni.ng the persona 1 i ty corre l·ates of persuas ibi 1 i ty. 
2. It would be worthwhile to test the idea that response bias 
causes high d.ogmati sm ·scores usi.ng other measures of uncertainty, such 
as doub 1 e .agreement, changed answers, et cetera. A 1 though Peabody demon-
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strated (Supra, p. 6) that double .agreement was about twice as frequent 
as true authoritarianism responses, he did not show that double agree-
ment was related to h.igh scores on the d_ogmatism seal e. Such a study 
m.ight produce valuable results for understandi.ng d.ogmatism scores. 
3. Further testi~g is needed of Rokeach•s contention that dog-
matic subjects are more persuasible because they cannot separate the 
message from the source. Tho.ugh Powell 1 s experiment · {Supra, p. 3) pro-
duced data supporting the idea that open-minded subjects can different-
iate between source and message better than closed-minded subjects, sim-
ilar findings, taking into consideration both persuasibility and dogma-
tism, would strengthen the conclusion. 
4. Research should be conducted to determine the relationship 
between dogmatism and persuasibility using a measure of persuasibility 
that includes the alteration of more centralized beliefs. The topics 
on the Janis-Field Test are all aimed at altering what Rokeach calls 
inconsequential or peripheral beliefs (Type E).53 Wright and Harvey 
found that authoritarians tend to uprotect their attitudes toward a 
limited number of central concepts at the expense of the larger number 
of peripheral ones.u54 This finding suggests that dogmatic subjects 
might actually be more persuasible only when their less important be-
liefs are under question. This idea should be investigated experimen-
tally • 
. f~rt~er . inves~igation will produce more ins~ght into the rela-
53Ibi d. 
54Mi 1 ton Rokeach, ·Bel i.efs; ·Attitudes; · and ·va 1 ues (San Franci sea: 
Jossey-Bass, · Inc., l968), . p. 1'1 
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tionship between persuasibility and d.ogmatism and possibly solidify 
concepts from which some principl~s of persuasion can be developed. 
· · s urruna ry 
Several inves~igators have found that those who are h~ghly sus-
ceptible to persuasion are significantly more ~ogmatic than those who 
are less susceptible to persuasion. Altho.ugh Cronkhite, in his book, 
Persuasion: · ·speech ·and ·sehavioral ·change, su_ggests that the relation-
ship between these two variables seems surprising, few studies have 
been done to determine why the relationship exists. 
This study was designed to investigate the possibility that per-
suasible people, who are expected to have a high intolerance of ambig-
uity, might appear to be dogmatic because of a response bias previously 
demonstrated in the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale. 
Positive answers on the Rokeach Scale always signify dogmatism, 
and studies have shown that people tend to give positive answers when 
they are uncertain about ambiguous questions. Thus, it was hypothe-
sized that a persuasible person who is highly intolerant of ambiguity 
might have a high score on the Rokeach Scale because of the response 
bias factor. 
Subjects for the study were 121 undergraduate students at Auburn 
University. Tests were administered in order to obtain persuasibility, 
dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and uncertainty scores for each 
subject. 
The statistical measures applied to the data were three t tests 
and Kendall 1 s Rank-Order Correlation. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects who scored high on the per-
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suasibility test would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than 
those who scored low on the persuasibility test. Hypothesis 2 predicted 
that subjects who scored high on the intolerance of am~iguity scale 
would have significantly higher dogmatism scores than those who scored 
low on the intolerance of ambiguity scale. Hypothesis 3 predicted that 
subjects who scored high on the persuasibility test would have signifi-
cantly higher intolerance of ambiguity scores than those who had scored 
low on the persuasibility test. Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant 
correlation between dogmatism and uncertainty scores. Hypothesis 5 pre-
dicted that subjects who had high persuasibility scoY'es would have sig-
nificantly higher uncertainty scores than those who had low persuasibil-
ity scores. The sixth, and final hypothesis, predicted that subjects 
who had high dogmatism scores would have significantly higher uncer-
tainty scores than those who had low dogmatism scores. 
There were four principle conclusions drawn from the study. Peo-
ple W1o are highly dogmatic appear to be significantly more persuasible 
than those who are not dogmatic. People who are highly persuasible are 
not significantly more toler~nt of ambiguity than those who are not 
persuasible. Thirdly, people who are highly dogmatic appear to be sig-
nificantly more intolerant of ambiguity than those who are not dogmatic. 
Lastly, there was no significant correlation between dogmatism scores 
and uncertainty scores. 
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APPENDIX A 
Reconstructed Form of~okeach Dogmatism Scale (Form P) 
Instructions: Circle the number after each statement that represents 
your agreement or disagreement with that statement. 
3 = Strong Agreement 
2 = Moderate Agreement 
1 = Slight Agreement 
0 = Uncertainty due to ambiguous nature of the statement 
-1 = Slight Disagreement 
-2 = Moderate Disagreement 
-3 = Strong Disagreement 
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in ·common. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form 
of democracy is a government run by those who are the most intelli-
gent. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
4. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the 
people who believe in the same thing he does. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
5. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard 
against id€as put out by people or groups in one•s own camp than by 
those in opposite camps. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
6. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its 
members cannot exist for long. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
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7. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquain-
tance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
8. In this complicat~d world of ours the only way we can know what's 
goi.ng on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
9. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what•s going on 
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one res-
pects. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
10. In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends and assoc-
iates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one•s own. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
11. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the 
future that counts. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
12. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes nec-
essary to gamble 11 all or nothing at all 11 • 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
13. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed import-
ant social and moral problems don•t really understand what•s going 
on. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
14. Most people just don•t know what•s good for them. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
15. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful 
of really great thinkers. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
16. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the 
things they stand for. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
17. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
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18. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that 
life becomes meaningful. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 ;.3 
19. Of all the differ~nt philosophies which exist in this world there is 
probably only one which is correct. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
20. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to 
be pretty 11Wishy-washy" as a person. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
21. To compromise without political opponents is dangerous because it 
usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
22. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be 
careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from 
the way we do. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
23. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers 
primarily his own happiness. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
24. There are two kinds of people in the world: those who are for the 
truth and those who are against the truth. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
25. My blood whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he•s wrong. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
26. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath con-
tempt. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
27. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren•t worth the paper 
they are printed on. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
28. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
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29. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
30. Most people just don•t give a 11 damn 11 for others. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
31. I 1 d like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve 
my prob 1 ems. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
32. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
33. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
34. Once I get worked up in a heated conversation I just can't stop. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
35. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several 
times to make sure I am being understood. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
36. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am 
going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
37. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
38. While I don•t like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition 
i~ to become a great man, like Einstein or Beethoven or Shakespeare. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
39. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something im-
portant. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
40. If given the chance I waul d do somethi.ng of. great benefit to the 
world. 
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
APPENDIX B 
SCORES USED IN COMPUTING KENDALL 1 S RANK-ORDER CORRELATION 
Subject Dogmatism Score · Uncertainty ·score · · ·n ·Higher · ·# ·Lower 
1 63 10 4 114 
2 74 34 0 119 
3 81 6 10 105 
4 89 0 81 0 
5 95 0 81 0 
6 103 0 81 0 
7 109 2 34 57 
8 112 1 57 34 
9 112 2 34 56 
10 113 0 78 0 
11 114 3 26 30 
12 114 1 55 33 
13 116 0 76 0 
14 116 3 26 28 
15 121 1 54 32 
16 121 11 1 103 
17 ~ 121 4 17 80 
18 121 2 30 52 
19 122 3 24 26 
20 122 4 17 78 
21 123 2 20 52 
22 123 2 28 52 
23 124 0 67 0 
24 124 5 12 81 
25 125 1 46 31 
26 125 0 65 0 
27 129 0 65 0 
28 130 0 65 0 
29 133 2 27 47 
30 134 0 64 0 
31 134 1 45 27 
32 134 0 63 0 
33 135 1 45 26 
34 135 0 26 0 
35 135 0 45 25 
36 136 4 16 64 
37 137 18 0 84 
38 138 2 25 81 
39 138 2 25 0 
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Appendix B Continued: 
.. 
·· subject · Dogmatism ·score · · Uncerta; nt.Y ·Score · · ·#Higher · ·#Lower · · 
40 139 0 57 24 
41 139_ 1 41 0 
42 139 0 56 38 
43 140 2 25 38 
44 141 0 55 0 
45 142 0 55 0 
46 142 1 40 21 
47 142 5 11 60 
48 143 2 24 35 
49 143 4 14 54 
50 143 1 37 21 
51 144 7 7 63 
52 144 1 36 21 
53 145 4 . 13 52 
54 145 1 35 21 
55 146 0 46 0 
56 147 2 21 31 
57 147 0 45 0 
58 147 0 45 0 
59 147 8 6 56 
60 149 10 1 59 
61 151 0 43 . 0 
62 151 11 0 59 
63 152 1 31 17 
64 152 0 41 0 
65 153 2 18 26 
66 153 0 40 0 
67 153 5 7 45 
68 154 0 39 0 
69 154 2 17 24 
70 155 1 28 14 
71 155 1 28 14 
72 155 1 28 14 
73 156 9 1 45 
74 156 0 34 0 
75 157 2 16 20 
76 158 5 6 38 
77 158 4 7 35 
78 159 0 31 0 
79 159 3 9 29 
80 160 2 13 19 
81 163 1 22 
12 
82 163 2 13 
18 
83 163 3 9 26 
84 163 9 1 35 
85 164 2 11 18 
86 164 0 24 
0 
87 164 0 24 
0 
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Appendix B continued: 
·subject · ·oogmatism ·score ·· ·uncertainty ·score ·· ·#Higher ·· ·#tower ·· 
88 166-- 0 24 0 
89 166 0 24 0 
90 167 9 1 30 
91 169 2 10 14 
92 169 0 22 0 
93 170 10 0 28 
94 170 5 3 24 
95 171 2 8 13 
96 174 6 0 23 
97 174 4 2 21 
98 180 2 6 13 
99 180 6 0 21 
100 181 2 5 13 
101 181 2 5 13 
102 183 0 13 0 
103 183 1 7 6 
104 184 0 12 0 
105 184 1 7 5 
106 186 0 11 0 
107 187 1 7 4 
108 187 2 5 7 
109 189 0 9 0 
110 193 4 1 10 
111 193 6 0 10 
112 195 2 3 6 
113 196 1 3 3 
114 199 0 5 0 
115 205 1 3 
2 
116 207 1 3 
2 
117 206 3 0 
2 
118 211 3 0 
2 
119 211 0 1 
0 
120 214 3 0 
1 
121 249 0 0 
0 
